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A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism
Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21 (2014)
Abstract
There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be false.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.
Why Should We Be Pessimistic about Antirealists and Pessimists?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (3):613-625.
Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
References found in this work
The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth.Larry Laudan - 1977 - University of California Press.
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