A phenomenological argument for stage theory

Analysis 75 (2):237-242 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper presents an argument that the way we experience time is more consistent with our being instantaneous objects than with our being temporally extended throughout our entire lifetimes. By argument to the best explanation therefore, experiencing subjects persons are stages, rather than worms

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,830

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-06-11

Downloads
310 (#88,523)

6 months
20 (#143,265)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Josh Parsons
PhD: Australian National University; Last affiliation: University of Otago

Citations of this work

Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Non-Compensable Harms.Todd Karhu - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):222–230.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.

View all 19 references / Add more references