Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox

Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152 (1984)
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10.1007/bf00453019

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Terence Parsons
University of California, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224.
There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither.Jc Beall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):Article no. 1.
Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
Belief and Indeterminacy.Michael Caie - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):1-54.

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References found in this work

How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The language of morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1980 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by P. T. Geach & Max Black.
On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.

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