Axiological actualism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):137 – 147 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This intuition may be contrasted with the incompatible intuitions that might support, say, average utilitarianism. According to average utilitarianism we should bring about that outcome which has the highest average utility. That someone would have a higher than average level of utility is, therefore, ceteris paribus a reason to act so that that person exists. Because of this, the basic intuition is a reason for rejecting average utilitarianism

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Axiological actualism and the converse intuition.Dale E. Miller - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123 – 125.
The importance of being actual: Some reasons for and against procreation.Paul Sludds - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):561 – 568.
Utilitarianism: The Classical Principle and the Average Principle.R. I. Sikora - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):409 - 419.
Superlongevity and utilitarianism.Mark Walker - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):581 – 595.
The diminishing marginal value of happy people.James L. Hudson - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):123 - 137.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
156 (#151,185)

6 months
5 (#702,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Josh Parsons
PhD: Australian National University; Last affiliation: University of Otago

References found in this work

Theories of actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.
Possible worlds.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1976 - Noûs 10 (1):65-75.
Theories of Actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1979 - In Michael J. Loux, The Possible and the actual: readings in the metaphysics of modality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 190.
The non-identity problem.James Woodward - 1986 - Ethics 96 (4):804-831.

View all 7 references / Add more references