The Unity of Classical Pragmatism

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 8:233-244 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has been argued that pragmatism as a philosophical movement lacks unity. However, contrasts and similarities are always relative to a level of generality on which they can be distinguished. And, although Peirce, James, and Dewey disagree on a number of important issues, they have quite a number of assumptions and theses in common. The most general and important of these theses is the belief that how our beliefs relate to reality depends on our actions, and that the semantical independence of our actions plays a crucial role in the development of our theoretical beliefs. Although there are other beliefs and assumptions common to the three classical pragmatists, even this property is enough to distinguish the classical pragmatists from one of their contemporary followers, Richard Rorty.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,458

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Pragmatism.Robert Almeder - 2019 - In Graham Oppy (ed.), A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Hoboken: Blackwell. pp. 111–122.
Language and Experience for Pragmatism.Cheryl Misak - 2014 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2).
Pragmatism: An Introduction.Michael Bacon - 2012 - Malden, MA: Polity.
Can Philosophy and Education Still Emancipate Humanity?León Olivé - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:107-116.
Reality in Practice.Maria Calcaterra Rosa - 2015 - Esercizi Filosofici 10 (2).
Pragmatism.Sandra B. Rosenthal - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 8:245-256.
Why Classical American Pragmatism is Helpful for Thinking about Death.Charles A. Hobbs - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (2):182-195.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
36 (#629,586)

6 months
4 (#1,252,858)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references