Metaphysics over Methodology--Or, Why Infidelity Provides No Grounds To Divorce Causes from Probabilities

Abstract

A reduction of causation to probabilities would be a great achievement, if it were possible.  In this paper I want to defend this reductionist ambition against some recent criticisms from Gurol Irzik (1996) and Dan Hausman (1998). In particular, I want to show that the reductionist programme can be absolved of a vice which is widely thought to disable it--the vice of infidelity

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David Papineau
King's College London

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