Can a truth value have causal power?

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32:89-96 (1998)
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Abstract

John Gibbons tries to show that the notion of similarities and differences between different cases of events reveals the relevance of relational properties, which are of causal relevance. Based on such considerations, Gibbons' main claim is that the truth value somebody assigns to his or her beliefs has causal power. This means that the deflationary theory of truth becomes false. The questions therefore are: What are the similarities and differences between different cases? What kind of properties are relational properties? What is the causal relevance of such relational properties, and why should the truth value be of causal relevance? Why can Gibbons not show that the truth value has the relevant causal power?

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