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Against causal descriptivism
Mind and Society 5 (1):78-84 (2006)
Abstract
Causal descriptivism and its relative nominal descriptivism are critically examined. It is argued that they do not manage to undermine the principal conclusions of the new theory of referenceAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - In Andrea Bianchi, Language and reality from a naturalistic perspective: Themes from Michael Devitt. Cham: Springer. pp. 69–103.
Realism, reference & perspective.Carl Hoefer & Genoveva Martí - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-22.
Names, Descriptions and Causal Descriptions. Is the Magic Gone?Genoveva Martí - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):1-9.
References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
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