Pragmatism and the ideal language

Philosophy of Science 27 (3):271-278 (1960)
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Abstract

Pursuing a line of progression articulated by Prof. Quine, Dr. Pasch (Experience and the Analytic) argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction rests on mere convention. Further, that the use of this distinction by present day empiricists--especially the rational reconstructionists--has caused empiricism to take a departure from traditional empiricism. I observe, in opposition, 1) the natural language firmament is itself an amorphous construct, 2) the natural language might be the language of experience but not of empiricism, 3) the ideal language is tied to experience by primitives for what perceptually appears, and 4) if one claims the primitives must be tested in scientific inquiry, a case should be made for this philosophical position

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