Third parties belief in a just world and secondary victimization

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):30-31 (2013)
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Abstract

This commentary focuses on how third parties impact the course of acts of revenge based on their world views, such as belief in a just world. Assuming this belief to be true, the following questions could be asked: (a) What are the consequences of a third party's worldview in terms of secondary victimization? (b) Are bystanders actually aware of these consequences? (c) If so, then why do they let it happens?

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Workings of the will.Julius Kuhl & Sander L. Koole - 2004 - In Jeff Greenberg, Sander Leon Koole & Thomas A. Pyszczynski (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology. Guilford Press. pp. 411--430.

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