A democratic argument for animal uplifting

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Nonhuman animals are unable to exert any direct control over the functioning of democratic institutions –the decisions of which, nevertheless, have a pervasive impact on their lives. Their interests are therefore likelier to be set back or unfairly discounted, and their choices are more vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Because of this, some authors have suggested that we ought to redesign our political institutions so that they are more responsive to the interests of animals. We argue that this strategy fails to address the root of the problem, which is animals’ lack of robust political agency. We defend that, should it become technologically feasible, we have a pro tanto obligation, derived from the values that underpin democracy, to uplift, or radically enhance, the political agency of nonhuman animals, so that they can better participate in mass democratic politics, express their interests as they see them, self-organise to defend them, and hold their representatives accountable. Finally, we explain how our argument manages to resist the most important objections against animal enhancement and, in some cases, it does so better than alternative proposals based on the value of animal well-being.

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Author Profiles

Pablo Magaña
Trinity College, Dublin
Eze Paez
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
Human genetic enhancements: A transhumanist perspective.Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4):493-506.
Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice.Jeff McMahan - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1):3-35.

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