An Epistemic Puzzle About Knowledge and Rational Credence

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):195-206 (2019)
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Abstract

I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: if S knows P, then the epistemic justi...

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2020

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10.1080/02698595.2019.1704615

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References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.

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