(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?

Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):290-307 (2023)
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Abstract

I suggest that the theories of remembering one finds in the philosophy of memory literature are best characterised as theories principally operating at three different levels of inquiry. Simulationist views are theories of the psychofunctional process type remembering. Causalist views are theories of referential remembering. Epistemic views are theories of successful remembering. Insofar as there is conflict between these theories, it is a conflict of integration rather than—as widely presented—head‐on disagreement. Viewed in this way, we can see the previous awareness condition and preservationism as principles applying at only some of the corresponding levels of inquiry. Where either principle has been rejected, it is, I claim, due to arguments which slip between these different levels. While the view of the landscape I offer does not dissolve ongoing disputes about the nature of remembering, it clarifies the dialectical rules of engagement, helping to clear the path for future, collaborative progress to be made. The view enables us to see less conflict in the recent philosophy of memory literature than there seems at face value to be.

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James Openshaw
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Citations of this work

Naturalism and simulationism in the philosophy of memory.Nikola Andonovski & Kourken Michaelian - 2024 - In Ali Hossein Khani, Gary Kemp, Hassan Amiriara & Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Naturalism and its challenges. New York, NY: Routledge.
Engrams as mental files.Nikola Andonovski - 2024 - Synthese 204 (6):1-36.
Remembering is an Imaginative Project.Seth Goldwasser - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-37.

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References found in this work

Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Generative memory.Kourken Michaelian - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):323-342.
Remembering.C. B. Martin & Max Deutscher - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (April):161-96.

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