Evidentiality as Fundamental Problem of «Clear Scienсes» (Descartes and Husserl at the Sources of Conscience)

Sententiae 3 (1):30-39 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Because methodical doubt is a process of demarcation of scientific (clear) and non-scientific constructions, then in this process Descartes affirmed truly neo-positivistic principle. Descartes` rational transformation of thinking is usage methods of mechanical sciences to «sciences about spirit» attaching to them also natural status. But Descartes had not noticed that scientific obviousnesses with time turns into dogmas. That is why Husserl offered to describe phenomena after riching «epoche» about natural-scientific beliefs. Search of pretheoretical grounds of obviousness has led to loss of clarity and of its apodictic weight. Because «obviousnesses» were always founded on historico-philosophical invariant, then needed either reconsider Descartes «technique» or kernel of decomposition and reconstruct «laws of thinking» in respect to it.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Science and Theology in Descartes' "Meditations on First Philosophy".Peter E. Vedder - 1999 - Dissertation, The Catholic University of America
René Descartes.Jason Porterfield - 2017 - New York: Rosen Publishing.
Certainty and Explanation in Descartes’s Philosophy of Science.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):302-327.
The Freedom of Thought: Patočka on Descartes and Husserl.Anita Williams - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (1):37-49.
Descartes' metaphysical physics.Daniel Garber - 1992 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-01

Downloads
11 (#1,430,561)

6 months
4 (#1,279,871)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.
Philosophy as Rigorous Science.Edmund Husserl - 2002 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 2:249-295.

Add more references