Abstract

The problem of evil is a perennial issue in metaphysics, philosophy of religion and theology. In Yorùbá thought, it has been approached, appraised, and conceptualised by scholars from different perspectives, usually in the form of thesis and antithesis. For instance, Ẹ̀bùn Odùwọlé and Kazeem Fáyẹmí disagree on whether or not the problem arises in Yorùbá thought and on its nature or formulation, if it does. Relying on the Western logical formulation of the problem, Odùwọlé maintains that the problem of evil arises in Yorùbá thought exactly like it does in Western thought; hence, for her, the problem of evil is universal. Against this view, Fáyẹmí contends that the philosophical problem of evil does not arise at all in Yorùbá thought; hence, the problem, according to him, is not universal. Employing the methods of critical exposition and analysis, however, I maintain a position different from those of the two scholars mentioned. I contend, on the one hand, that the existence of the philosophical problem of evil in Yorùbá thought does not necessarily imply the logical formulation of the problem as we have in the West. On the other hand, however, I maintain that the absence of the logical formulation of the problem of evil in Yorùbá thought does not directly imply the absence of the philosophical problem of evil in it. I therefore approach the interpretation of the philosophical problem of evil in Yorùbá thought from an existentialist perspective, drawing insights from some relevant verses of Ifá.