Truth-Conditions and Contradiction

American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):363 - 372 (1993)
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Abstract

Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless their application is restricted. We can avoid such restrictions by refusing to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. Such a refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. And the basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide range of contradictions, without having to exclude more than we want.

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