Can a Justified Belief Be False?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):561 - 568 (1976)
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Abstract

Robert richman tries to defend a justified-True-Belief analysis of knowledge by attacking the assumption that a justified belief can be false. But, Although 'p is justified but false' is incoherent if asserted about the way things actually are, It is not incoherent if asserted about a supposed situation. And critics of a justified-True-Belief analysis need only do the latter

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Citations of this work

Prospects for a Causal Theory of Knowledge.Philip P. Hanson - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):457 - 473.

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References found in this work

An alleged defect in Gettier counter-examples.Richard Feldman - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
Knowledge without paradox.Robert G. Meyers & Kenneth Stern - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (6):147-160.
Truth and evidence.Robert Almeder - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):365-368.
Why I Know so Much More than You Do.William W. Rozeboom - 1967 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):281 - 290.
Knowledge as Justified, True Belief.Charles Pailthorp - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):25 - 47.

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