Abstract

Suppose that the value of each act of compliance with some maxim is lower than the value of each act of non-compliance, even though maxim-compliance overall would be best for the agent. In such a case we have what I will call value-discrepancy between act and maxim. While the value of overall maxim-compliance is high, no particular act of compliance with the maxim seems to be worth it. Consequentialism is the thesis that the rightness of an option is determined by the comparative value of that option, and that the value of an option is determined in some way by the value of its outcomes. What should the consequentialist say about maxim-compliance in cases of value discrepancy? An enormous amount of work has been done on the possible value-discrepancy between individual compliance, and group compliance. Call this the multiple-agent problem. Less work has been done on the related but distinct single-agent problem: value discrepancy between act and maxim for a single perduring individual over an extended period of time. There is a reason for the comparative lack of attention directed at the single-agent problem. An analogy is often drawn between a group of synchronic agents and a single perduring agent, and it is usually assumed that solutions to the one problem will be strict analogues to solutions to the other. But the enthusiasm for this analogy has become exaggerated. Significant disanalogies between the two cases have been ignored. As a result, simple and elegant solutions to the single-agent problem, which are often not available in the multiple-agent case, are overlooked. I offer such a solution.