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Sins of omission and commission
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):997-998 (2001)
Abstract
O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Towards a sensorimotor approach to flavour and smell.Becky Millar - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (2):221-240.
A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists).Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103-125.
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