Emulation or Stimulation? On Exemplars in John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Nietzsche
Dissertation, New York University (
2000)
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Abstract
This dissertation examines the views of individuality in the work of Mill and Nietzsche and operates on the presupposition that neutrality between different conceptions of the good is the most vital aspect of liberalism. I begin by arguing that Mill's On Liberty offers compelling arguments for neutrality, while his Utilitarianism contradicts this by arguing that there are 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, and competent judges who will inform us of the difference, and therefore that there are some choices that people ought to be stopped from making. Unlike previous theorists of the contradiction, I seek always to privilege On Liberty over Utilitarianism. In Nietzsche's work, unlike Mill's, I find no contradiction in his position on individuality. ;For Nietzsche, there can be no definition of the individual since any attempt at definition must limit the possibility of an individual becoming who he is. I argue that where Mill ultimately seeks to offer a model of individuality which we ought to emulate, Nietzsche is determined not to offer models for emulation, but rather to present exemplars in the hope that they might stimulate the few people who can create their own "table of values" and thus be individual. ;I then look at some of the critiques that Nietzsche might make of Mill. I argue that he should have admired a quantitative utilitarianism and the celebration of individuality in On Liberty , but that he would have utterly rejected Mill's qualitative utilitarianism. Three surrogates, Alan Ryan, Wendy Donner, and Joseph Raz, are then introduced to defend Mill, but they do not succeed, primarily because in looking to utilitarian justifications for individuality they end up rejecting his liberty principle. ;Despite the anti-liberal nature of much of Nietzsche's thought, I argue that he is far more liberal than Mill where liberalism is defined as a political theory which favors neutrality between different conceptions of the good, and I conclude with some preliminary remarks on the institutional ramifications of a Nietzschean liberalism