Ubuntu as a Plausible Ground for a Normative Theory of Justice from the African Place

In Jonathan O. Chimakonam, Edwin Etieyibo & Ike Odimegwu, Essays on Contemporary Issues in African Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 169-191 (2021)
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Abstract

I contend that if theories of justice are often constructed from a specific understanding of the nature of humans, then Ubuntu can serve as a base for a normative theory of justice from an African context. The underlying claim here is that Ubuntu encapsulates a prevalent view in the intellectual heritage of Africa about the nature of human beings. I buttress this position by following the research imperative of conversational philosophy which posits that critical and creative engagement with extant perspectives is a necessary prelude that makes the articulation of a more profound proposal possible. My focus is mainly on the approach to Ubuntu as a theory of personhood−an Africa-inspired philosophical anthropology. One basic objection that one faces in this approach is the view that Ubuntu is an exclusivist theory of personhood. And if Ubuntu is inherently and irredeemably exclusivne, then it cannot be a plausible base for a theory of justice in a diverse society inhabited by those it excludes. Contrary to this, my conversational engagement with some of the prominent works on the nature of Ubuntu suggests that Ubuntu is inherently an inclusive theory of personhood. The said exclusivist sense of Ubuntu is a distortion that often emerges from attempts to arrive at a fixed definition of Ubuntu that is absolute, complete and eternal independent of its social and historical affinities.

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