Abstract

The dissertation defends a character trait or motivational theory of criminal law justification defenses. In brief, the proposal is that in a properly constructed criminal justice system justification defenses defeat a normally warranted inference from criminally proscribed conduct to substandard moral motivation . In thus construing justifications, the proposal departs from the recent trend among contemporary legal theorists of regarding justifications as essentially involving an "objective" evaluation of conduct. Extreme objectivists view an agent's motivation as irrelevant to the validity of justification defenses. Other theorists add a motivational, or "justificatory intent," requirement to what is essentially an objective theory of justification, in an effort to avoid potential counter-examples to a purely objective account. Unfortunately, absent a theory of criminal responsibility that provides a supporting rationale for its inclusion, the additional psychological requirement often appears ad hoc. The approach adopted in this dissertation is to provide the necessary supporting rationale by regarding the criminal law as a motivational supplement to moral motivation. One implication of the proposed motivational theory is that the logic of the criminal law defenses of justification and excuse is much closer than typically acknowledged