Simply, false

Analysis 69 (1):69-78 (2009)
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Abstract

According to the Simple View of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman, φ-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to φ. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's, Garcia's, Sverdlik's, Stout's, and Adams's – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.

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10.1093/analys/ann011

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Ezio Di Nucci
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.
The intentional and the intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
Intentional and unintentional actions.Michael Gorr & Terence Horgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):251 - 262.

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