Davidson on social externalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94 (2005)
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Abstract

A central premise in Tyler Burge's argument for social externalism says that an incomplete understanding can be sufficient for concept possession. Burge claims that this premise is grounded in ordinary practices of giving psychological explanations. On the basis of an extended version of Burge's 'arthritis' case Donald Davidson has argued that this claim is false. The paper argues that Davidson's argument is unconvincing. A closer analysis of Davidson's extended 'arthritis' case shows that the belief ascriptions Davidson focuses on actually support social externalism

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Citations of this work

Triangular Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 2013 - In Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig, Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 443-455.

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References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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