Abstract

Evolutionary debunking arguments claim that the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs imply that those beliefs cannot be justified under the assumption of moral realism. In chapter one I outline three prominent evolutionary debunking arguments in the literature, and in chapter two I outline two types of “minimalist” replies to debunking arguments. These replies grant that our moral beliefs are not explained by the moral facts and then rely on substantive moral claims to show that our moral beliefs might still be reliable. One way of objecting to these minimalist responses is to claim that the explanatory disconnect implied by debunking arguments defeats our moral beliefs, and so minimalist replies are not entitled to rely on substantive moral claims once they have granted this explanatory disconnect. In chapter 3 I argue that information can undermine our beliefs even if does not imply that our beliefs are modally insecure, and that this removes one way that the minimalist might deny that the explanatory disconnect implied by debunking arguments defeats those beliefs. In the next chapter I argue for a specific explanatory constraint on belief:. I point out, however, that according to, EDAs do not, by themselves, establish the explanatory disconnect that defeats our belief. In chapter five I supplement EDAs with my own arguments which, when combined with EDA’s, establish that our moral beliefs are defeated according to. When EDAs are combined with these arguments, minimalist replies fail because they crucially rely on defeated moral beliefs. In the final chapter, I consider and reject a potential avenue of response by the minimalist, and considering this response sheds further light on the kind of attitude we can have towards our belief that defeats that belief.