Abstract

The main objective of this study is the assessment of some of the skeptical views that have been advanced about consciousness via the findings of contemporary scientific research. Chapter 1 introduces some preliminary considerations. Chapter 2 deals with skepticism concerning the reality of consciousness and its amenability to scientific investigation. My response is framed by research on the state of general anesthesia. Chapter 3 deals with the skeptical view that conscious experience does not have the properties designated by the concept of qualia. This view is examined in relation to the findings of contemporary research on pain, smell, and taste. Chapters 4 and 5 address skeptical challenges to one of the most salient properties of consciousness, its unity. Chapter 4 questions some arguments advanced by Dennett concerning the unity of non-reflexive consciousness by considering current neuroscientific knowledge. Chapter 5 deals with arguments raised against the unity of reflexive consciousness via the examination of the clinical syndrome of anosognosia. In the conclusion I indicate some of the general guiding assumptions of this study in order to offer some justification in support of the adopted response to the skeptical challenge