Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze Hilary Putnam’s philosophy of mind. The early and late periods of the philosopher's work are analyzed to identify the key ideas of Putnam’s philosophy of mind in each. The early period is characterized by the development of a functionalist approach to the interpretation of mental states. According to functionalism, mental states must be explained in terms of their functions. The turning point that defined the division into early and late periods of Putnam’s philosophy of mind was the philosopher’s concept of semantic externalism, according to which the content of mental states is determined by external factors. The externalist conclusions ran counter to the individualist ideas of functionalism, which is why the philosopher became one of the main critics of the movement he was at the origin of. However, it cannot be said that the rupture was final. The late period is characterized by a shift away from treating mental states as independent of the external world. Another feature of the late period is the philosopher’s focus on the problem of perception, which develops an approach called “transactionalism”. A distinctive feature of transactionalism is the attempt to reconcile phenomenalism and the idea of qualia with naive realism. It concludes with an attempt to reflect on the paradigmatic significance of the evolution of Putnam’s ideas. It is concluded that the methodological lesson to be drawn from the analysis of Putnam’s evolution, his critical analysis and self-criticism will reveal the contradictions of contemporary philosophical discussions.