Philosophy as a system of conditionals

Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56 (S1):85-93 (2020)
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Abstract

Philosophical statements are often suppositions. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposes in Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain, 1704, a method of the construction of assertive conditionals occurring between any philosophical suppositions. If we can infer a philosophical statement from any suppositions then the implication between these suppositions and the obtained statement is assertive. In the article, some examples of the application of Leibniz’s method are considered.

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