Abstract

The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in _lokaprasiddhi_ / -_prasiddha_, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts _everything_ that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of _lokaprasiddhi_ instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist _lokaprasiddha_ and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of _lokaprasiddhi_ that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the _hoi polloi_. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of _āgama_ Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms _lokaprasiddhi_ / -_prasiddha_, _loka_- / _laukikavyavahāra_, _saṃvṛti_ and _saṃvṛtisatya_, and _laukika paramārtha_. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (_laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa_), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (_laukika paramārtha_), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (_jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin_). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (_laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā_), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (_lokaprasiddhi_).