The Epistemic Value of the Democratic Process

Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):19-32 (2008)
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Abstract

An epistemic theory of democracy, I assume, is meant to provide on answer to the question of why democracy is desirable. It does so by trying to show how the democratic process can have epistemic value. I begin by describing a couple of examples of epistemic theories in the literature and bringing out what they presuppose. I then examine a particular type of theory, worked out most thoroughly by Joshua Cohen, which seems to imply that democracy has epistemic value. The key idea in this theory is that its conception of political right isitselfa democratic conception – roughly, what is right is constituted by a consensus among ideal democratic agents. If democratic procedures are modeled on this conception of right, the theory proposes, the fact that we follow these procedures in decision-making will give us reason to believe that the outcomes are themselves right. I do not reject the democratic conception of the right, but I argue that the theory breaks down when we try to extend its conclusions to real-world democratic procedures. While it invites interesting speculation about possible reforms, it gives us little reason to accept the outcomes of actual democratic politics.

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original Nelson, William (2008) "The epistemic value of the democratic process". Episteme 5(1):pp. 19-32

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Citations of this work

Disagreement and epistemic arguments for democracy.Sean Ingham - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (2):136-155.

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References found in this work

Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment.Samuel Freeman - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):371-418.
Reflections on Habermas on Democracy.Joshua Cohen - 1999 - Ratio Juris 12 (4):385-416.
The Democracy/Contractualism Analogy.David Estlund - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (4):387-412.

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