The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception

In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,130

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What Mary Couldn’t Know: Belief About Phenomenal States.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219–41.
What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal states.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41.
Phenomenal space and the unity of conscious experience.Douglas B. Meehan - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought.Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
Emotion and the function of consciousness.Craig DeLancey - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references