Yablo’s Paradox: Is the Infinite Liar Lying to Us?

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (3):88-102 (2019)
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Abstract

In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain types of relations between the semantic content of such sentences.

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Andrei Nekhaev
University of Tyumen

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The “Standard Liar”: Wittgenstein, Language-Games and Self-Reference.A. Nekhaev - 2020 - Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science 14 (56):23–32.

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