Generative Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Gaps

American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):355-367 (2024)
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Abstract

The ever increasing use of generative artificial intelligence raises significant questions about authorship and related issues such as credit and accountability. In this paper, I consider whether works produced by means of users inputting natural language prompts into Generative Adversarial Networks are works of authorship. I argue that they are not. This is not due to concerns about randomness or machine-assistance compromising human labor or intellectual vision, but instead due to the syntactical and compositional limitations of existing AI systems in handling natural language prompts. This, I argue, gives rise to ‘authorship gaps’.

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Tamer Nawar
Universitat de Barcelona

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References found in this work

Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.
Killer robots.Robert Sparrow - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):62–77.

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