Abstract

This article is in large part an exposition and interpretation of the Woodruff Smith intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness. And, it is propaedeutic to considering, subsequently in the present series, the first of six theses regarding inner awareness that Kriegel defended in a recently published issue of this journal. Included here, as well, is some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness. Kriegel defended his first thesis with special critical reference to phenomenologist Woodruff Smith’s theory, and maintained that, on the contrary, a conscious mental-occurrence instance presents itself, too: albeit secondarily, in the sense of its receiving less attention than does its primary object . Woodruff Smith conceived of inner awareness — the apprehension that one immediately has, as they take place, of many of one’s mental-occurrence instances — to be part of the modality of presentation of a mental-occurrence instance’s primary object. That is, the inner awareness intrinsic to a conscious mental-occurrence instance “modifies” the presentation in that mental-occurrence instance. I would like to put it for Woodruff Smith that inner awareness is the reflexive way in which a conscious mental-occurrence instance is an awareness of its primary object — as the latter’s being, inter alia, an object of this conscious mental-occurrence instance. However, his conception includes that every conscious mental-occurrence instance possesses a “phenomenal quality” — which amounts to the instance’s appearing in the mind — and inner awareness is awareness of this appearance. This seems to mean a conscious mental-occurrence instance, too, is presented therein, contrary to both that the presentation in any mental-occurrence instance is just of its primary object and that the inner-awareness feature “modifies” the only presentation there is within a conscious mental-occurrence instance