Concerning introspective "knowledge"

Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111 (1970)
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Abstract

Discusses the nature of introspective awareness, those events by whose occurrence acquire knowledge of our own mental episodes. Present orienting attitudes towards mental episodes and awareness of them are made explicit, as are some of the basic concepts to be used. Introspective awarenesses are discussed from the perspective of S; afterimages, pains, sense impressions, visual contents, and thoughts are examined as contents of introspective awarenesses. The intrinsic or factual character of such awarenesses is considered from the perspectives of 3 materialist theories: that of B. F. Skinner, which claims introspective awarenesses to be verbal responses; that which claims that all awarenesses are thoughts; and that which interprets introspection as an instantaneous acquiring of belief or belieflike central states

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