Perceiving indeterminately

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):160-166 (2020)
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Abstract

It has been argued recently that perception is indeterminate. But there are more than one ways of spelling out what this means. The standard line is that perceptual states attribute different probabilities to different propositions. I provide an alternative to this view, where it is not the attitude, but the content of perceptual states that is indeterminate, inasmuch as it consists of the representation of determinable properties. This view does justice to the more general claim that perception is indeterminate without appealing to probability either in the attitude or in the content.

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Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

Modeling Mental Qualities.Andrew Y. Lee - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):263-209.
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence.John Morrison - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):106-135.

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References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter, The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.

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