The distinctive character of knowledge

Behavioral and Brain Sciences (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Because knowledge entails true belief, it is can be hard to explain why a given action is naturally seen as driven by one of these states as opposed to the other. A simpler and more radical characterization of knowledge helps to solve this problem while also shedding some light on what is special about social learning.

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Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Knowledge and mentality.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):359-382.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.

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