Logic

In The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Nagel argues that there is no room for skepticism about basic logic or mathematics since thoughts like 2 + 2 Í 4 cannot be dislodged by any other propositions. Such examples of reason are immune to doubt and must be recognized by all as having universal validity. Nagel rejects as unintelligible Descartes’s idea that God, with his omnipotence and ultimate responsibility, could have made the truths of logic and mathematics other than they are. For Nagel, doubts about reasoning cannot avoid using some form of reasoning, and certain forms of reasoning cannot intelligibly be doubted because they form the irreducible framework of everything we can think about the world and ourselves.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,795

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Logic is not Logic.Jean-Ives Béziau - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):73-102.
The logic of impossible quantities.David Sherry - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (1):37-62.
Psychologism and psychology.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):487 – 504.
Science.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - In The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evidence in Logic.Ben Martin & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
Formal Logic and Dialectics.Chou Ku-Ch'eng - 1969 - Chinese Studies in Philosophy 1 (1):5.
A logic of practical reasoning.Georg Spielthenner - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):139-153.
Presuppositions for Logic.Joseph Agassi - 1982 - The Monist 65 (4):465-480.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
7 (#1,644,695)

6 months
5 (#1,071,419)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references