Abstract

In several publications Charles Taylor makes a distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' evaluations. Strong evaluations are qualitative distinctions — in terms of 'noble', 'demeaning' etc. Weak evaluators evaluate desires only on the basis of their strength and intensity. Strong evaluations are, within the framework of Harry Frankfurt's theory,moral secondorder desires. For Frankfurt, having second-order desires is a defining characteristic of being a person. According to Taylor, however, someone only then is a person, has an identity, if he makes strong evaluations. The ethical theory par excellence that is not capable of making qualitative distinctions, is for Taylor utilitarianism. After having explored the meaning of the concept ofstrong evaluations, I analyse Taylor's argument for that critique on utilitarianism. Ifhis critique is justified, and if making strong evaluations is a condition for havingidentity, utilitarians do not have an identity. I argue that qualitative distinctions cannot be built into a utilitarian theory. However, not all utilitarians are weak evaluators. More sophisticated utilitarians evaluate desires by their contribution to a rational life-plan. They do have an identity, but it is not a moral one. My conclusion is thatwhat Taylor really means is that utilitarians are not able to articulate their identity. An identity can only be articulated within tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive 'evaluative frameworks'