Abstract

Donald Davidson maintains that the following three intuitions of our common sense outlook: an agent's reasons are causally relevant to the actions he or she performs; the relation between reasons and actions is not subject to lawlike regularities; and events related as cause and effect are subject to lawlike regularities are compatible with the following three tenets which define his version of the causal theory of action: when an agent acts for a reason, reason and action are related as cause and effect; explanations of actions by citing events related as cause and effect; and explanations of actions are not backed by laws and lawlike generalizations. ;In this thesis, I argue that given our ordinary notion of cause and given the presuppositions of ordinary causal explanations, we see that Davidson's theory of action is incoherent, as tenet is incompatible with each of tenets and . Tenet is one of our common sense intuitions, however, and therefore carries greater force than tenets and of Davidson's theory. I maintain that the notion of agency as control, defended by Harry Frankfurt, provides an alternative account of the relation between reasons and actions than that of cause and effect which satisfies the intuition that an agent's reasons are causally relevant to the actions he or she performs, but in such a way that the relation between reasons and actions is not subject to lawlike regularities. As explanations of actions presuppose this causal relation between reasons and actions, they are causal explanations all right, but, unlike ordinary causal explanations, they do not explain by citing events related as cause and effect. The resulting theory of action satisfies the common sense intuitions underlying Davidson's version of the causal theory of action