Manifestability and Epistemic Truth

Topoi 31 (1):17-26 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic

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2012-01-20

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Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

More Reflections on Consequence.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):223-258.
Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de TeorĂ­a, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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