Knowledge is not a Conceptual Kind

Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Hawaii International Conference on the Arts and Humanities (2004)
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Abstract

I argue that knowledge is a natural kind found in the modules of a massively modular mind. As such, it is not a conceptual kind. The result is that knowledge must be studied empirically and not by appeal to a priori analysis.

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Murray Clarke
Concordia University

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