Resemblances of identity: Ludwig Wittgenstein and contemporary feminist legal theory

Res Publica 12 (2):137-162 (2006)
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Abstract

In a context in which there is manifest multiplicity in women’s daily lives, feminists have struggled to identify what it uniquely means to be a woman, without falling prey to charges of essentialism. Conscious, however, of the role which collective gender identity plays in providing coherence and motivation to feminist activity, a number of theorists have sought to find a way to retain group cohesion in the face of internal diversity. In this article, the merits and demerits of pre-existing attempts in this regard will be discussed. Having done so, an alternative approach, which builds on Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblances’, will be put forward and defended.

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References found in this work

Essentialism and anti-essentialism in feminist philosophy.Alison Stone - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):135-153.
Feminism, Aestheticism and the Limits of Law.Anne Barron - 2000 - Feminist Legal Studies 8 (3):275-317.

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