Abstract

Contemporary moral philosophers generally claim that there is both a moral and a nonmoral sense of such key terms as "ought" and "right." Professor Wertheimer attempts to disprove this claim as well as the significance of contemporary metaethical investigations by establishing that such terms, especially the modal auxiliary verb "ought," are univocal, and, as a result, that a proper understanding of them will reveal nothing about the nature of morality. Wertheimer defines "n ought to v" as a conjunction of the following clauses: 1) There exists an adequate relevant System y; 2) there exists a property F such that "Fn" is true; and 3) according to y, F is such that if "Fn" is true, and C obtains then "nv" is true. A crucial point about this definition is that the truth of "ought" statements is always defended by an implicit reference to the existence of an adequate relevant system; "ought" statements in science are based on an adequate scientific system, moral "ought" statements on an adequate moral system. Thus, a decision about the truth of such statements is not a semantic issue, but one of assessing the adequacy of the system appealed to. This view of "ought" statements along with a similar one of other moral terms is the basis of Wertheimer’s provocative contention that metaethics, which has received the major share of moral philosophers’ attention in the twentieth century, is bound to be unproductive.