Abstract

John Dewey's appeal to the principle of continuity in defense of his metaphysics and epistemology has been both widely criticized and repeatedly misunderstood. I analyze the principle of continuity and show that it has a sufficiently clear meaning and justification to acquit Dewey of the charge that his metaphysics and epistemology are inconsistent. My analysis distinguishes two basic dimensions of continuity, those of process and connection. I argue that Dewey's appeal to continuity is always to one or the other of these aspects of continuity. Moreover, I distinguish two fundamental applications of the principle of continuity: the general matrix of continuity which involves biological and temporal continuities, and the philosophical matrix which includes experiential, linguistic and methodological continuities. The first matrix is the basis for the empirical warrant of the principle of continuity; the second involves the particular philosophical doctrines which Dewey derives from the adoption of the principle. Together, these two matrices of continuity explain the various appeals to continuity that Dewey makes and serve to defend his philosophy against the charge of inconsistency. ;The importance of this study is that it brings the central tenet of Dewey's philosophy into philosophical focus. The principle of continuity, as the assertion of the connected and processive character of existence, possesses a positive content that makes it more than just the converse of Dewey's denial of dualism. Although the principle of continuity serves to bridge several traditional dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, it also recommends a naturalism and empiricism that is richer than those views inspired by British Empiricism. It is this brand of naturalism and empiricism that can be defended by an appeal to the principle of continuity once its full meaning and range of application is made clear