Abstract

Plato believes that part of philosophy's task is to persuade people to pursue virtue and wisdom instead of the things they falsely believe worth having. I argue that Plato considers the appetites---desires for pleasure---to be a major obstacle to this task, and turns to spirit as a solution to this dilemma. ;The Gorgias shows Socrates attempting but failing to persuade others, and offers an explanation for his failures. Socrates' method is beneficial but unpleasant: he frustrates people's desires to be confirmed in their values and ways of life. Rhetoric, meanwhile, is persuasive precisely because it is pleasant: it gratifies the very desires that dialectic frustrates. Most people confuse pleasure with benefit, and therefore resist dialectic but are persuaded by rhetoric. These facts raise the possibility that rhetoric could aid philosophy, exploiting the appetites for philosophy's ends. The dialogue concludes pessimistically, however: given the nature of the appetites, they cannot be used to lead people to virtue. ;I show that Plato's mistrust of the appetites is explained by his idea that pleasure is a deceiver: it appears to be good when it is not. Plato develops this idea in the Protagoras, Gorgias and Republic . Ultimately, it leads him to abandon the Socratic view that all desires are rational desires for the good in favor of the view that desires for pleasure are non-rational and must be suppressed. ;How can one make people see that the life of virtue is good if they are deceived by the appearance that the pleasant but vicious life is best? The Gorgias' discussion of shame suggests an answer to this problem. What is shameful appears bad, and what is kalon appears good. These appearances often conflict with, and can overcome, the false appearances generated by pleasures. Therefore appeals to shame and admiration can succeed where appeals to reason will fail. With its introduction of thumos the Republic develops this insight into a new picture of the soul, and a new program for moral education