Physicalism and global supervenience

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,894

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
97 (#233,699)

6 months
11 (#343,540)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago

Citations of this work

Naturalism, reduction and normativity: Pressing from below.John F. Post - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1–27.
Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing from Below.John F. Post - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1-27.
Naturalism and psychological explanation.Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.
A Priori Arguments for Reductionism.Jennifer Rea Susse - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references