Abstract

In this paper, I consider two possible rejections of the epistemic reality of blasphemy and heresy. I argue that these rejections fail. First, I consider a relativistic rejection of heresy and blasphemy by considering a general objection to epistemological relativism coupled with a brief account of the possibility of epistemic neutrality between competing religious claims. Given neutrality, it is possible that a particular religious claim may really be blasphemous or heretical. Second, I consider a realistic rejection of heresy and blasphemy. I argue, following Eleanor Stump, that if one's epistemology is to be both coherent and true, including an epistemology that rejects blasphemy or heresy as real, there must at least be the possibility of blasphemy or heresy. These ideas are then connected with the general notion of how the epistemic reality of blasphemy and heresy function in free and pluralistic societies which desire truth and coherence in their religious belief