Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good

In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 65 (2010)
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Jessica Moss
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Citations of this work

An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
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Kant and the “Old formula of the schools”.Robert B. Louden - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):63-74.
Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham

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