Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelson's notions of coherence cannot be accepted

Abstract

In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,621

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
82 (#275,847)

6 months
5 (#860,048)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references